This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent rules regarding corporate governance and a better system of investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong firms about adopting these strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that changes in top executive compensation are more sensitive to sales growth in cross-listed firms than they are in mainland firms without cross-listing.
Introduction
Cross-listing refers to situations where firms list their shares on one or more foreign stock exchanges in addition to a domestic exchange. The opportunity to raise capital from global investors and the promise of increased visibility in the foreign markets provide the motivation for firms to cross-list their stock. According to recent studies, another important motivation for cross-listing is the so-called "bonding hypothesis". Coffee (1999) was among the first to propose that firms incorporated in a country with a less developed stock market can creditably bond themselves by cross listing their shares in a more developed foreign stock market.
So far, empirical evidence on the "bonding" hypothesis comes mostly from studies of companies listed in the U.S. For examples, Doidge (2004) finds that cross listing is associated with lower private benefit of control; Bauer et al. (2005) finds that firms cross-listed in the U.S. have higher corporate governance ratings than firms without a U.S. cross listing; other studies suggest that cross-listing in the U.S. brings advantages such as better valuation, lower cost of capital, more scrutiny by financial analysts, and greater access to external finance Hail and Leuz, 2006; Lang et al., 2003 Lang et al., , 2006 Reese and Weisbach, 2002) .
However, there are also studies challenging the "bonding" hypothesis. Licht (2001, 2003) questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in enforcing the U.S.'s more stringent corporate governance rules on foreign firms. In support of this view, Siegel (2005) found that the SEC's enforcement imposed on Mexican firms cross-listed in the U.S. was generally weak. Furthermore, Companies listed on either of these two stock exchanges may offer "A shares" to domestic investors and "B shares" to foreign investors. The two stock exchanges and Company Law is further supplemented by the specific regulations of the CSRC. The policies, rules, and regulations in the mainland are viewed as less developed than those of Hong Kong. An example lies in the differences in the requirements for independent directors to serve on the executive compensation committee of the board. The CSRC requires that only one third of directors be independent, and that independent directors take their responsibility seriously in important company matters such as executive appointment and compensation, and auditing and information disclosure. 1 In comparison, Hong Kong SFC regulations are quite detailed and require not only the majority of directors be non-executive and independent, but also that the most important board committees such as the auditing and executive remuneration committees comprise only non-executive directors.
2 Several studies find that only a small fraction of A-share companies have established an executive compensation committee on the board, and the effectiveness of the committee is questionable; for those without the committee, the situation is worse and executives often set their own salaries (Firth et al., 2006b ); HK companies, on the other hand, generally establish executive remuneration committees. These committees are composed of non-executive directors and outside experts, and are often more independent than the rest of the board (Ho, 2003) . Some researchers suggest that the problem of executives colluding with large state shareholders in expropriating minority investors is quite serious among A-share companies (Jian and Wong, 2003; Jiang et al., 2005) ; others have also questioned the quality of financial disclosure and the independence of external auditing of A-share companies (Bao and Chow, 1999; DeFond et al., 1999; Wang et al., 2008) . Overall, after examining creditor rights, investor rights, the rules of law, and corruption, Allen et al. (2005) deem that Hong Kong is among countries like the U.S., U.K., Japan, Singapore, and Germany with the best investor protection, whereas mainland China ranked among Mexico and Indonesia, which are considered to have a poorer investor protection. Similarly, in 2002, CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, the independent brokerage and investment group ranked Hong Kong second in their corporate governance rating of Asian countries, and ranked mainland China sixteenth (CLSA, 2002) .
Since Hong Kong appears to have more stringent governance rules and a better investor protection than mainland China, executive compensation of HK companies is often more sensitive to company performance than that of mainland companies. The question is whether cross-listed companies have become assimilated to HK local firms in linking executive pay to performance. The stronger executive incentives adopted by cross-listed companies may be the result of improvements after cross-listing, or simply due to the "selection effect", i.e. only those companies that are in better condition are allowed to be listed in Hong Kong. We cannot disentangle these two effects. Our focus is to test whether the overall effect of cross-listing is positive. One distinguishing feature of our study is that we set two benchmarks for Chinese companies cross-listed in Hong Kong: one is based on executive incentives of mainland A-share companies; the other is based on executive incentives of HK local companies. The comparison of these three groups reveals whether cross-listed companies have caught up with HK companies or still lag behind, and also whether cross-listed companies have shown improvement over A-share companies.
Our study is most closely related to Ke et al. (2008) who compared mainland companies cross-listed in Hong Kong to those without a HK cross-listing in terms of the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance. However, there are several important differences between our paper and Ke et al. (2008) . First, our study includes an additional comparison between cross-listed companies and Hong Kong local companies. Second, and more importantly, Ke et al. (2008) Our work also benefits from previous studies that have extensively investigated the relationship of executive pay or turnover to performance of A-share companies, such as Chi and Wang (2009), Firth et al. (2006a, b) , Kato and Long (2006) , Aivazian et al. (2005) , and Mengistae and Xu (2004) . In methodology, we follow Kaplan (1994) who compared the sensitivity of top executive rewards to firm performance of Japanese companies with that of U.S. companies.
Our findings are mixed. When firm performance is measured by sales growth, executive compensation is more sensitive to performance in cross-listed companies than in mainland companies without cross-listing. Cross-listed companies have caught up with HK firms in linking executive pay to sales growth, but in terms of incentives tied to stock returns, cross-listed firms still lag behind. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes data, sample selection, and variables; Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper.
Data
The We use several variables to measure firm performance: Market value of equity is the total market value of tradable shares at the fiscal year end and stated in millions of RMB Yuan; Stock return is annual stock return from the first month of fiscal year t to the end of the fiscal year, adjusted for dividends; Sales is net sales revenue for the fiscal year t , also stated in millions of RMB Yuan; Sales growth is the change in the logarithm of sales from year t -1 to t; ROA is net income divided by total assets at year end. To overcome extreme values, we winsorize sales growth and ROA to the range of [-20, 20] .
Change in ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t; Loss is a dummy variable that equals one if net income in year t or t-1 is negative. Eastern Airlines and Huaneng Power, are large in terms of assets and sales and also are the respective industry leaders, which may drive up the average value for cross-listed firms. As can be seen, the median value of equity and sales of the three types of companies is more similar than the mean value, with HK firms being a little smaller. 
Regression Results
To check consistency with previous research (Ke et al., 2008) However, different from Ke et al. (2008) , we find that A-share company executive compensation is also sensitive to stock returns, especially in the more recent years (in 2005 and 2006) . These differences could be due to different years of data used in our study compared to those used in Ke et al. (2008) and the level regression may also be sensitive to the specific year chosen.
5
The level regression uses cross-firm variation to identify the effect of firm performance on executive compensation and it is likely to be subject to omitted variable 5 Ke et al. (2008) Table 3 .
Several important points emerge from Table 3 : First, there is some evidence suggesting that the change in executive compensation is more sensitive to stock returns in HK firms than in cross-listed and A-share firms. This result is mainly driven by the response of HK firms to the lagged stock return (stock return, t-1). It also appears that cross-listed companies are more similar to A-share companies than to HK companies in terms of executive incentives tied to stock returns. Moreover, despite being less sensitive to stock returns than HK firms, the first differencing estimates suggest A-share firms are still significantly sensitive to stock returns at t, which is consistent with the level estimates in Table 2 .
Second, cross-listed firms have exceeded A-share and HK companies in the responsiveness of compensation changes with respect to sales growth. HK firms, on the other hand, are somewhat more sensitive to sales growth than A-share companies. When A-share companies, especially of those controlled by the state, is not sensitive to stock returns.
all four sets of performance variables are included in the regression, the differences between the three groups of firms are significant.
Third, the estimates of the sensitivity of executive compensation changes to the change in ROA are positive and sizeable but are only marginally significant for A-share and cross-listed companies. After including other performance variables, the estimates become insignificant. The comparison between groups did not produce significant patterns due to large standard errors. However, there is some weak evidence suggesting that A-share executive compensation changes may be more sensitive to the change in ROA than those of HK firms.
Finally, the change in executive compensation of mainland firms seems to be more sensitive to losses, although the results are statistically insignificant. This result may be partially due to the strict rules imposed by the CSRC on profitability. According to CSRC regulations, A-share companies incurring losses for two consecutive years will be put under special treatment (ST). The companies with losses for three consecutive years face the risk of delisting.
Since ownership structure may have a significant impact on executive incentives, we also conduct an analysis controlling for ownership types. Descriptive results in Table   1 show that the three types of companies have a similar level of shareholder concentration. Therefore, our focus is rather on the type of largest shareholder, specifically whether it is private or the state. For mainland and cross-listed companies, we estimate separate regressions when the largest shareholder is the state and when it is private. We also test the differences between the two situations. Since HK firms are all private, there is no need for separate regressions for them. The results are reported in Table 4 .
As can be seen, for mainland A-share companies, the change in executive compensation is more sensitive to the change in ROA in state companies than in non-state companies, whereas in the non-state A-share companies, the change in the compensation is more sensitive to losses. This result is likely due to the different evaluation and incentive systems for executives in state and non-state companies. In many cases the government still evaluates state companies based on their total profits and taxes paid (Tenev et al., 2002) .
For cross-listed companies, state and non-state firms are similar in terms of the relationship of executive compensation changes to stock returns and losses, but they differ significantly in the responsiveness to sales growth in that state companies that are cross-listed are more sensitive to sales growth than the non-state. Moreover, simple eyeballing suggests that the state-controlled cross-listed companies are also more sensitive to the change in ROA than the non-state controlled companies, but the statistical test of these differences is insignificant. Finally, the test of equality using all four sets of performance variables (groups A-D in Table 4) shows that for A-share companies, the differences between the state and the non-state are significant, while for cross-listed firms, the differences are not significant. This result suggests that cross-listing may help reduce the influence of government in state-controlled firms, and cause the state and non-state firms to adopt similar executive incentives in the foreign market.
In any case, Table 4 suggests the necessity to distinguish state and non-state firms in the analysis. For this reason, we carry out additional tests of differences and report the results in Table 5 . We compared A-share state companies with cross-listed state companies and with HK firms; and we also compared A-share non-state companies with cross-listed non-state companies and with HK firms. These results show that the earlier results in Table 3 suggesting that the change in executive compensation of cross-listed companies is sensitive to sales growth is actually mostly driven by the behavior of state-controlled cross-listed firms, while the sensitivity of mainland companies to losses is mainly due to private firms. Moreover, state-controlled A-share firms appear to be particularly sensitive to the changes in ROA.
Overall, Table 5 shows that, for non-state companies, the differences between cross-listed and A-share companies are insignificant, while for state companies, the differences are significant. These results are consistent with Table 4 , suggesting that cross-listing has a greater impact on state-controlled companies than on non-state controlled companies. For state-controlled companies, cross-listing has been associated with the change in the performance indicator used to determine executive pay raises (from ROA to sales growth). For non-state companies, the changes in executive incentives are not apparent.
Summary and Conclusion
In conclusion, we find that the pattern of response of executive compensation to firm performance differs among mainland companies cross-listed in Hong Kong, mainland companies that are not cross-listed, and HK firms. Executive compensation in cross-listed companies is more sensitive to sales growth than mainland firms, but less sensitive to stock returns than HK firms. When state and non-state firms are separately examined, we find that in the state-controlled cross-listed firms the change in executive compensation is responsive to sales growth, while in the non-state controlled companies the incentives tied to sales growth are not much different from the companies without cross-listing. Moreover, for mainland A-share companies, we find that changes in executive compensation are particularly sensitive to the changes in ROA in the state-controlled firms while changes in executive compensation are sensitive to losses in the non-state controlled firms. This finding suggests that the state and non-state controlled companies differ in terms of which performance measure carries the most weight in determining executive pay increases -in the case of the state-controlled firms, it is ROA, while for non-state controlled firms the pay raises are more sensitive to losses.
These results provide some evidence in support of the hypothesis that cross-listing is associated with a stronger relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. The hypothesis is supported when performance is measured by sales growth, particularly for state-controlled companies. Furthermore, our study shows that cross-listing may have a greater impact on executive incentives in state companies and reduce differences between state and non-state controlled companies traded in Hong
Kong. Nevertheless, both types of companies still differ from HK local firms in their sensitivity of executive compensation changes to stock returns. (8)- (14), performance variables are included jointly. In all the regressions, the change in leverage, the change in lnAssets, and constant are included but not reported. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. † indicates that the differences between groups are significant at the 10 percent level or better. indicates that the test of equality for t and t-1 jointly is significant at the 10 percent level or better. (3) and (7)- (9), performance measures A-D are included individually in the regression. In columns (4)- (6) and (10)- (12), performance variables are included jointly. In all the regressions, the change in leverage, the change in lnAssets, and constant are included but not reported. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. † indicates that the differences between groups are significant at the 10 percent level or better. indicates that the test of equality for t and t-1 jointly is significant at the 10 percent level or better.
